Looking Back . . . And Ahead by Paemen, Hugo
Fordham International Law Journal
Volume 23, Issue 3 1999 Article 1
Looking Back . . . And Ahead
Hugo Paemen∗
∗
Copyright c©1999 by the authors. Fordham International Law Journal is produced by The Berke-
ley Electronic Press (bepress). http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ilj
Looking Back . . . And Ahead
Hugo Paemen
Abstract
It seems that any projection of Europe’s future today must pass through the prism of its multi-
faceted relationship with the United States. To some Europeans, this thought is obnoxious. The
role of the United States as the sole world power, however, makes this concept even more ineludi-
ble. How should it be done? And how can the United States help, once more? These are some
of the thoughts that occasionally crop up in the back of the mind of someone dealing with the
day-to-day vicissitudes of European Union (‘EU‘) and U.S. relations.
INTRODUCTION
LOOKING BACK... AND AHEAD
Hugo Paemen*
Looking back, at the beginning of the new millennium, one
may find it difficult not to yield to the somewhat Hegelian view
that the last two centuries witnessed history finally getting even
with Europe and the detrimental forces it unleashed during the
course of the last century. The names of these forces were ex-
treme nationalism, proletarian revolution, national socialism,
communism, fascism, and dictatorship in 'its different forms.
Will Europe use what seems to be an interlude to establish the
foundation of a solid continental democracy?
It is also difficult not to be impressed by the decisive role
that, over and again, was played in this historic process of re-
trieval by the United States of America. Directly and indirectly,
the United States was ready to rescue and heal where Europeans
seemed to stumble. But this type of oversight could not happen
without leaving heavy marks. How do the Europeans view the
future of their unified continent in a globalized world, working
with the different pieces, values, traditions, and experiences in-
herited at the end of the twentieth century?
It seems that any projection of Europe's future today must
pass through the prism of its multi-faceted relationship with the
United States. To some Europeans, this thought is obnoxious.
The role of the United States as the sole world power, however,
makes this concept even more ineludible. How should it be
done? And how can the United States help, once more? These
are some of the thoughts that occasionally crop up in the back of
the mind of someone dealing with the day-to-day vicissitudes of
European Union ("EU") and U.S. relations.
I. THE NEW TRANSATLANTIC AGENDA
On December 3, 1995, President William Clinton for the
United States, and Prime Minister Felipe Gonzilez and Presi-
* Senior Advisor, Hogan and Hartson L.L.P.; Former Head of the European Com-
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dent Jacques Santer for the EU, signed a remarkable document.
Ambassador Stuart Eizenstat, who was the main promoter of the
initiative, called it "the most significant step in US-EU relations
since the beginning of the European integration movement in
the 1950s." The underlying reason for the document was that-
in the light of the new geo-political developments after the col-
lapse of the Soviet Union-"new challenges at home and
abroad," facing the U.S. and the EU were "determined to rein-
force (their) political and economic partnership as a powerful
force for good in the world." As a result, an extensive Joint Ac-
tion Plan was approved that covered four main areas: diplo-
macy, global societal challenges, international economic rela-
tions, and people-to-people relations. Furthermore, more sys-
tematic mutual information, consultation, cooperation, and
common action (where possible) were scheduled under the gui-
dance of a Senior Level Group ("SLG") of sub-cabinet officials
from both sides.
The New Transatlantic Agenda ("NTA") initiative has fos-
tered the unfolding of cooperative initiatives in many areas,
more particularly under the two most innovative headings:
"Global Challenges" and "People-to-People Contacts." Regula-
tors and agencies, traditionally very reluctant to share their in-
formation in areas such as international crime, drug trafficking,
terrorism, environment, and public health have opened commu-
nication channels, compared problem analyses, and cooperated
to find the best solutions to common problems.
As for the People-to-People Contacts, new ties have been es-
tablished at the non-governmental level between different ele-
ments of the civil societies on both sides. Consumer organiza-
tions, environmental groups, trade unions, and business organi-
zations, respectively, have initiated transatlantic dialogues aimed
at establishing solutions to common problems. The working
method, adjusted by each group to its own needs, is always the
same: a common analysis of the specific sectors by the represent-
atives of both sides, without governmental interference. Each
group develops common recommendations, which are then ad-
dressed to the respective authorities.
It was predictable that the transatlantic business dialogue
("TABD") would be the easiest to launch, given the existing
channels of communication and communality of interests. The
added value of the TABD process, embodied in concrete results
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such as the Mutual Recognition Agreement ("MRA") negotia-
tions, has already been widely recognized and applauded by the
business communities on both sides. But the same spirit of prag-
matic and efficient cooperation prevails in other dialogues.
One of the most promising dialogues should become the
recently inaugurated Transatlantic Legislators Dialogue, where
members of the U.S. Congress and the European Parliament dis-
cuss common problems and compare legislative approaches. A
number of so-called transatlantic irritants (not to speak of
"wars") could have been avoided if this type of preventive dia-
logue had occurred before legislative action took place. It is sur-
prising that in two more "traditional" sectors (diplomacy and
economic/trade relations), the added value of the NTA struc-
ture seems to have been unimpressive. From the media head-
lines one could even infer that, when it comes to the trade sec-
tor, NTA stands for "New Transatlantic Arguing." This might re-
fer to the highly visible litigation in the World Trade
Organization1 ("WTO") on bananas, hormone-based meat, and
genetically modified organisms ("GMOs"), as well as to the
hushkits and private data discussions. The defunct New Transat-
lantic Marketplace, which the NTA was "determined to create,"
along with the quasi-abortive Transatlantic Economic Partner-
ship, and the failure of the WTO Ministerial in Seattle indicate
that a real dialogue or a cooperative partnership needs more
than a Summit promulgation and an additional bureaucratic ap-
paratus.
Equally disappointing comments can be heard about the ab-
sence of real dialogue in matters of international political rela-
tions. Under the general heading "Promoting Peace and Stabil-
ity, Democracy and Development around the World," the scope
for political cooperation in the NTA was basically limited to the
wider European zone (including Russia and the Newly In-
dependent States), the Middle East, and humanitarian assistance
activities. An easy answer to the skeptics might be to refer to the
growing number of meetings between experts and officials and
the increasing number of attendees at these meetings. But that
will probably not be considered enough to create a "powerful
force for good in the world."
1. Agreement Establishing the Multilateral Trade Organization [World Trade Or-
ganization], Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 13 (1994) [hereinafter WTO Agreement].
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Europeans will easily invoke the rather ambiguous attitude
of the U.S. political establishment vis-a-vis the U.S.-EU partner-
ship in political matters. The feeling remains that the emer-
gence of a full-fledged European partner is not being en-
couraged. The preference seems to go to a certain freedom to
choose the right European ally on the right issue. U.S. interloc-
utors have an easy counter-argument by referring to the absence
of a real common foreign policy and to the ineffective European
decision-making process.
II. THE FACTS
The economic interdependence between Europe and the
United States is without comparison in the world and increases
steadily. Mutual trade and investment have made the transatlan-
tic marketplace a reality, notwithstanding the bureaucratic dis-
putes. Europeans have recently added more than US$100 bil-
lion a year to their investment stock in the United States, which
represents more than half the total U.S. Foreign Direct Invest-
ment. They have a substantial trade surplus, which reflects the
macro-economic reality of the market at this moment. U.S. in-
vestors are present in the majority of major European compa-
nies. Millions of jobs have been created through these mutual
investment flows.
Thanks to the wider contacts promoted in the context of
the NTA, more citizens outside the business community partici-
pate in transatlantic exchanges and common projects. When
the delegation of the European Commission in Washington sug-
gested, two years ago, the creation of some EU centers at U.S.
universities and research institutes, more than sixty proposals
followed. We had to reduce them to ten for funding reasons. It
appears that the recent developments in Europe, such as the cre-
ation of the Euro and the decision to enlarge the EU to the
countries of Central and Eastern Europe have considerably in-
creased U.S. curiosity concerning the European integration pro-
cess. It would be beneficial if a similar stimulus for the develop-
ment of Centers for American Studies could be created in Eu-
rope. Based on abundant media information, we have a
tendency, on both sides, to overestimate the extent of our knowl-
edge of each other and to take our mutual understanding as a
given.
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The survey on the American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign
Policy, published by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations in
1999, showed that: "As in previous surveys European Nations re-
main America's closest friends and allies measured in terms of
temperature readings on the feeling thermometer by the pub-
lic."' 2 Furthermore, "[p] erhaps influenced by progress on Euro-
pean Monetary Union and the contrasting gloomy financial
news from Asia, leaders register an increase in their assessment
of Europe's importance over Asia, from 42% in 1994 to 51%
... ." At the same time, despite the fact that "Americans have
warm feelings for Europe, they see greater vital interests in other
parts of the world presumably because that is also where they see
more problems." It is indeed likely that this strong, long-lasting
friendship has the disadvantage of being somewhat taken for
granted.
Beyond the economic area, a realistic view of the U.S.-EU
partnership will need to take into consideration some other ba-
sic facts. On the U.S. side, the position of sole superpower can
lead to an impulsive overestimation of what can or should be
achieved, or to deep frustration when it appears that there are
clear limits to what can be done. Disappointments in that sense,
combined with the feeling that vital interests are not under
threat, must largely be at the origin of what is called the isola-
tionist, or inward-looking tendencies in parts of the political es-
tablishment, especially Congress.
According to the study by the Chicago Council on Foreign
Relations on American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy, the
U.S. public has remained internationalist, but places the highest
priorities on foreign policy goals aimed at protecting its interests
rather than pursuing change abroad. U.S. diplomacy reflects
this development. It has become more reactive and discretion-
ary, hesitating between engagement and reprimand. In the
same vein, it will probably remain or become more exclusionary,
i.e., concentrated on how it can foster, in the most direct way,
U.S. interests in the big issues (anti-ballistic missile systems,
China, Middle East, and Russia). As the only power with global
responsibilities, the United States feels that it can only share
some of them for limited purposes. This goes for countries as
2. CHICAGO COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION AND U.S.
FOREIGN POLICY 1999 (John Rielly, ed. 1999).
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well as for international organizations. The same tendency also
seems reflected in the foreign policy thinking of the Republican
party candidates for the U.S. presidency. 3 Not unexpectedly, the
most unvarnished presentation of this approach came from the
powerful U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman
during his historic presentation before the U.N. Security Coun-
cil January 20, 1999. The very limited time given to foreign pol-
icy in the longest State of the Union presentation of this admin-
istration this year can be seen as another indication of the same
overall attitude.
On the European side, progress has been made since the
ratification of the Treaty of Amsterdam.4 This is true in terms of
the preparation of the decision making in foreign policy matters
as well as the presentation of the policy, thanks to the designa-
tion of Javier Solana as Secretary General of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization ("NATO") and spokesperson for the EU in
political matters. But the decision-making process has not been
substantially changed and still operates on the basis of consensus
decisions. This will continue to limit the operational strength of
the Common Foreign and Security Policy ("CFSP"). There is in-
deed a growing feeling that in order to become more effective
and relevant the CFSP will have to introduce more majority vot-
ing.
The initiatives taken in recent years to develop cooperation
in the defense sector, such as the British-French partnership in
Bosnia and the Franco-German Eurocorps, which is now being
enlarged, are also of considerable significance. Moreover, the
integration of the Petersburg Declaration into the Treaty of Am-
sterdam and the way in which the Franco-British defense initia-
tive has been taken over by the EU and further integrated in the
discussions about the future organization of NATO, seem to in-
dicate that the logic of the progressive integration of the Euro-
pean continent has now entered these more delicate sectors.
3. Condolleeza Rice, Promoting the National Interest, FoREIGN. AFF., Jan./Feb. 2000,
at 45; Robert Zoellick, A Republican Foreign Policy, FOREIGN AFi., Jan/Feb. 2000, at 63.
4. Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties
establishing the European Communities and certain related acts, Oct. 2, 1997, OJ. C
340/1 (1997) (amending Treaty on European Union ("TEU"), Treaty establishing the
European Community ("EC Treaty"), Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel
Community and Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community and re-
numbering articles of TEU and EC Treaty).
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These developments have already very substantially reduced the
schizophrenic ambiguity that has characterized the position of
European governments in the sector of Common Foreign Policy.
CONCLUSION
In the near future, U.S.-EU relations in these matters will
need to take into account and live with these basic facts. The
relationship between two equivalent economic partners will re-
main lopsided for some time, as far as political and military mat-
ters are concerned. The United States will want to conduct a
global foreign policy based on a strong economy and a unique
military capability. The EU will need to concentrate mainly on
its enlargement, its institutional reforms, and its relations with its
close neighbors. But that leaves a considerable communality of
interests in all sectors, which should convince both sides that an
open, trustful dialogue is more worth spending one's energy on
than the exacerbation of passing trade irritants or short term
bureaucratic rivalries.
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